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Alaska’s commercial salmon industry is in an economic crisis. 
Competition from farmed salmon, changes in consumer demand, 
and a worldwide economic slowdown—together with smaller sockeye 
salmon runs—are reducing the value of Alaska’s salmon harvest.
This crisis has prompted discussions among fishermen, processors, 
fishery managers, and government officials about how to help the 
salmon industry.
Part of the discussion has focused on options for “restructuring” the 
management of salmon fisheries to reduce costs, increase value, or steer 
more of the benefits to Alaskans and their communities. Any change 
in the fisheries must, of course, be lawful. Two important questions are 
whether specific restructuring options would be allowed under Alaska’s 
constitution, and who has the authority to make fundamental changes 
in how the fisheries are managed.
To help Alaskans better understand the legal and constitutional issues 
associated with restructuring the salmon fisheries, the University 
of Alaska’s Marine Advisory Program and Institute for Social and 
Economic Research, along with the Washington Sea Grant Program, 
sponsored a workshop in October 2002. Lawyers with expertise in 
Alaska natural resources and fisheries law answered questions about 
different options for restructuring.
This paper offers an overview of the issues raised at the workshop and 
reviews some of the workshop discussion. The issues are complex, and 
the information here is not legal advice. It’s a broad description of some 
of the legal issues Alaskans will have to think about in any restructuring 
of salmon fishery management.
Small steps are more likely to move forward than big steps.
 Jim Barnett, fisheries attorney
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Entry to Alaska’s salmon fisheries 
is limited—that is, the state 
government uses a system of entry 
permits to limit the number of 
fishermen and boats. Still, in many 
salmon fisheries there are more 
limited entry permits and boats than 
are needed to catch the fish. When 
prices and catch values were high, 
permit holders had little interest in 
reducing the number of boats. But 
as sockeye prices and fishing profits 
declined during the 1990s, permit 
holders began looking at ways to 
reduce the number of participants.
One option being talked about is 
buying back limited entry permits. 
Other options include co-ops, where 
only some of the permit holders fish 
but everybody shares the profits. 
Another possibility would be using a 
method based on harvest allocations, 
like the individual fishing quotas 
already used in some federally-
managed fisheries.
Every restructuring option raises 
lots of questions. How would 
managers’ ability to control catches 
and reach escapement goals be 
affected? Who would pay for 
permit buybacks, and how much? 
What should be the basis for 
allocations of fish to co-ops or 
other groups?
Also very important are social issues 
associated with any restructuring—
how would individuals and 
communities be affected by 
specific changes? This paper talks 
only about legal issues. But if 
there is restructuring in salmon 
management, all Alaskans need to 
think about the effects of change 
on the people and the communities 
that rely on the salmon fisheries.
Bristol Bay gillnet fishing boats jockey for position to catch salmon. 
Background
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Alaska’s constitution, unlike any 
other state constitution or the 
federal constitution, guarantees 
open access and management 
of natural resources for the 
benefit of the people. The open 
access clauses of the constitution 
provide for “common use” and“no 
exclusive right of fishery” (see 
adjacent box). These provisions 
guarantee open fisheries and are 
fundamental to any discussion 
of restructuring Alaska’s salmon 
fisheries.
The Alaska Supreme Court has 
said that “common use” means 
making it possible for the greatest 
number of people to participate 
in a fishery. Before statehood, 
Alaska’s natural resources had 
been controlled by commercial 
interests from outside the state. 
Remembering that history, 
delegates to Alaska’s constitutional 
convention wanted to insure that 
in the future all Alaskans would 
have access to the state’s natural 
resources.
But over time open access is 
likely to translate into growing 
numbers of fishermen and boats 
in a fishery, making it harder for 
any individual fisherman to make 
a profit. And during the 1960s, 
Alaska faced a crisis in the salmon 
fisheries, caused by low runs and 
increasing participation.
The state legislature responded to that 
crisis by passing limited entry laws in 
1962 and 1968; both were attempts 
to restrict entry mainly among non-
resident fishermen. Courts said these 
early limited entry laws violated both 
federal and state constitutions.
Legislators then proposed amending 
the “no exclusive right of fishery” 
clause of the constitution. Voters 
have to approve constitutional 
amendments; before such amendments 
can appear on the ballot, two thirds of 
both the state house and senate have to 
agree. In a 1972 election, 78 percent 
of Alaskans who voted approved 
an amendment adding language to 
the constitution, stating that the 
prohibition on an exclusive right of 
fishery “does not restrict the power of 
the State to limit entry into any fishery 
for purposes of resource conservation, 
to prevent economic distress among 
fishermen and those dependent 
upon them for a livelihood and to 
promote the efficient development of 
aquaculture in the State.”
Then, in 1973, the legislature adopted 
the Limited Entry Act, establishing the 
current limited entry system for the 
salmon fisheries. It has survived major 
court challenges.
The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the 
law in a 1983 decision in the Ostrosky 
case. But the court also recognized 
the continuing tension between open 
access and limited entry. In the 1988 
Johns case, the court said that to be 
constitutional, a limited entry system 
should impinge “as little as possible 
on the open fishery clauses consistent 
with the constitutional purposes of 
Wherever occurring in 
their natural state, fish, 
wildlife, and waters are 
reserved to the people for 
common use.










No exclusive right or 
special privilege of 
fishery shall be created 
or authorized in the 
natural waters of the 
State. This section does not 
restrict the power of the 
State to limit entry into 
any fishery for purposes of 
resource conservation, to 
prevent economic distress 
among fishermen and those 
dependent upon them for a 
livelihood and to promote 
the efficient development 
of aquaculture in the 
State. (Language added in 
1973.)
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limited entry, namely prevention 
of economic distress to fishermen 
and resource conservation.”
The state in fact restricts access to 
most of its natural resources—for 
example, it issues leases for 
extraction of oil, minerals, and 
timber from state-owned lands. 
Such leases meet the constitutional 
requirement for broad access to 
natural resources because everyone 
has an equal opportunity to bid 
for leases, the successful bidders 
pay for the rights, and the leases 
are for a limited time.
In the management of Alaska’s 
fisheries, however, there is a 
continuing tension between the 
social and constitutional goal 
of providing open access and 
the economic efficiencies that 
exclusive rights promote. The 
current economic crisis has made 
it clear that in some salmon 
fisheries, even with limited entry, 
there are still more fishermen and 
boats than are needed to catch 
the fish—and more than the 
fishery can support. We now turn 
to a summary of what workshop 
participants had to say about legal 
and constitutional issues affecting 
any potential changes in salmon 
management.
What Can We Do, Given the 
Requirement for Open Access? 
How Much Can Participation 
Be Restricted?
Workshop participants agreed that 
there isn’t any firm answer to those 
questions. Under our legal system, we 
don’t really know what can or cannot 
be done—what the constitution 
allows—until the Alaska Supreme 
Court rules. The only way to find 
out is to try something and then let 
it be brought to the court. This adds 
greatly to the uncertainty the fishing 
industry faces as it deals with issues of 
restructuring.
Would Amending the Constitution 
Solve This Problem?
Changing the constitution with 
an amendment—as was done in 
1973—could smooth the way for 
restructuring options that might 
otherwise be impossible, according 
to workshop participants.  But 
amendments are difficult, time 
consuming, and risky.
We don’t have any control 
over how many fish they 
grow in Norway or what 
the Japanese pay for it or 
what they grow in Chile. 
There is nothing we can 
do about that. The only 
thing we have a say about 
is how we do what we do. 
. . . We need to address 
the fact that we have too 
many boats, too many 
people, and too much 
expense chasing salmon all 
over the state of Alaska.
   
Dan Coffey, 
former chairman,
Alaska Board of Fisheries
Chignik tender boat removes salmon from 
purse seiner’s net while it is in the water.
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As we mentioned earlier, amending 
the constitution requires a two-
thirds vote of each house of the 
legislature—to put the amendment 
on the ballot for voter approval—
and a majority of the popular vote 
in a subsequent election. Also, if 
an amendment passes, it’s always 
uncertain how the court will 
interpret it, bringing the risk of 
unintended consequences.
One risk is that a court could decide 
an amendment in fact amounts to 
a “revision” of the constitution—
that is, a change broad enough to 
affect fundamental policy. Only 
a constitutional convention, like 
the one that drew up the original 
constitution, can revise it—and 
voters have to then ratify any 
revisions. No such convention 
has been called since the one that 
drafted the constitution.
Working within the existing 
framework of the constitution is 
preferable, in the view of workshop 
panelists. It is difficult to predict 
how the court will rule on any 
particular restructuring plan. But 
under the law, courts always have 
to balance the welfare of fishermen 
with the constitutional requirement 
for open access to the fisheries.
Workshop panelists suggested 
that people assess the needs of the 
specific fisheries in their regions. 
Look at the regulations and hire 
experts to determine if a particular 
option is well suited to a specific 
fishery. Develop options in ways 
that leave them open to the largest 
number of participants, and then 
consider who might have the 
authority to make the options work.
I would say the court has been hanging some meat on the 
skeleton of the constitution. They have been fleshing out what 
did the framers mean and how did those provisions apply to 
what’s going on today. . . .People sometimes ask,“How do you 
think the court will decide this?” Well, you are almost always 
going to hear a qualification in the response, because the fact is 
we just don’t always know. . . .
We ought to look at this constitution as a good thing 
and not as something that is limited. . .  . I would say, let’s 
work within this framework. [A]nything we do in terms of 
restructuring—let’s try to fit it with this idea, rather than try to 
amend it to allow us to do something that is more of a reaction 
to a current economic situation.
   Mike Stanley, fisheries attorney
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Another issue workshop participants 
discussed was who has the authority 
to make changes in fisheries 
management. Under Alaska’s 
constitution, authority to manage 
fisheries is vested in the legislature. 
The legislature has delegated 
management authority to the Board 
of Fisheries—a seven-member board, 
appointed by the governor. Each 
year, the board reviews hundreds 
of proposed changes to state 
fishing regulations. In general, it 
reviews different topics and areas 
on a set three-year cycle. A “call for 
proposals” is issued every winter, 
specifying which topics or areas will 
be open for regulatory change and 
when proposals are due (usually in 
April).
The board has the authority to open 
a fishery, restrict participation by 
gear type, allocate the harvest among 
different groups, and limit fishing 
to a defined geographic area. The 
board’s powers to set regulations are 
set out primarily in Alaska Statutes 
16.05.251.
It can use the following criteria for 
making allocations: history; number 
of residents; the importance of 
providing residents the opportunity 
to obtain fish for personal and 
family consumption; the availability 
of alternative resources; and the 
importance to the economy of 
opportunities for residents and 
non-residents.
But panelists pointed out that these 
are just general allocation guidelines. 
Sometimes criteria like historical 
catch do not work—especially in 
a fishery with declining harvests. 
Panelists suggested that if the board 
makes clear what criteria it is using 
and justifies them—even if they 
are not specifically spelled out in 
statutes—it is easier to defend them 
from legal challenges.
If you are a fisherman 
out there and you are 
thinking about suing to 
get satisfaction, I would 
advise you to take your 
money and invest it in 
the Board [of Fisheries] 
process—hire experts, 
do everything you can up 
front, and your money will 
generally be better spent.
  
Lance Nelson, assistant 
attorney general,
State of Alaska
Restructuring Through the Board of Fisheries
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What Can the Board Do?
Clearly, the Board of Fisheries has 
broad powers. But it has typically 
limited itself to working within the 
existing management system, as 
broadly determined by legislative 
policy. The legislature has not so far 
set any policy on restructuring the 
salmon fishery. This leaves fishermen 
wondering who to turn to with 
proposals for restructuring. Can they 
go to the board? Where is the dividing 
line between what the board can and 
cannot do?
Workshop participants said the board 
could do a lot if it chose to—but 
it lacks staff, expertise, and time to 
initiate broad policy changes on its 
own. Panelists noted that the federal 
government solved this problem by 
providing significant funding and 
staff to its North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council. The council 
has both the authority and the 
Develop your solutions for 
your location and then 
make sure those solutions 
don’t have statutory and 
regulatory impediments 
that prevent them from 
happening. I happen to 
believe that the Board of 
Fish is a good place to get 
a lot of your answers.
   
Dan Coffey, 
former chairman,
Alaska Board of Fisheries
means to plan for restructuring 
federally-managed fisheries off 
Alaska. According to workshop 
participants, the state legislature 
could do the same by providing 
the existing board—or a new 
entity—with authority and 
resources to restructure the 
salmon industry.
Fishermen could benefit from 
going to the board for support in 
restructuring efforts, panelists said. 
They advised fishermen to learn 
the politics of the board and the 
legislature and to explain what 
they want to do and why. There 
are no quick fixes or one-size-fits-
all solutions. Fishermen need to 
think about what would be best 
for their individual fisheries, to 
consult lawyers along the way, and 
to work creatively while insuring 
that important principles—such as 




One way to reduce the number of 
boats and fishermen is to buy back 
or “retire” permits. With fewer boats 
catching the same number of fish, 
the remaining permit holders stand a 
better chance of making money.
Some of the many issues involved in 
buybacks include who pays to buy 
the permits back, who gets bought 
out, and how much they are paid. 
How the buybacks are structured 
greatly affects who will benefit 
from them.
Current state law allows for buybacks 
financed by industry. If the state 
government bought back permits, 
the legislature would first have to 
pass a law to finance and govern the 
buyback.
But buybacks in any of their 
forms may prove unconstitutional. 
Reducing the number of permits in 
a limited entry fishery may cause the 
fishery to become too “exclusive,” 
conflicting with the “no exclusive 
right of fishery” clause in Alaska’s 
constitution.
In a state or federal buyback 
program, the government would 
have to justify reducing the 
number of permits. One way of 
doing that would be determining 
the“optimum number” of permits. 
The Commercial Fisheries Entry 
Commission, which controls the 
number of permit holders in state-
managed fisheries, has the authority 
under state law to determine the 
“optimum number” of permits for 
any given fishery.
But optimum-number studies 
are complex, depend on variables 
that can change rapidly, and may 
take years to complete. And they 
are subject to court challenges. 
Courts might even decide on a new 
“optimum number” of permits. 
Workshop participants pointed out 
that the complexities of developing 
a defensible optimum number–
coupled with the potential for courts 
to become involved–could leave 
fishermen facing uncertainty 
for years.
Establishing Co-ops
To form a fishing cooperative, 
either all or some of the permit 
holders in a fishery agree that 
only some of the co-op members 
will fish, but all will share in the 
profits. Some of the permit holders 
in the Chignik purse seine fishery 
petitioned the Alaska Board of 
Fisheries in 2001 to approve such 
a co-op. They asked the board to 
give separate allocations–and assign 
separate fishing times–to those who 
wanted to form a co-op and those 
who wanted to fish independently. 
The board approved, but some 
independent Chignik permit holders 
challenged the co-op in court. 
The trial court upheld the board’s 
decision, but the fishermen appealed 
to the Alaska Supreme Court. As 
of late 2003, the court had not yet 
ruled on the appeal.
Attorneys at the workshop agreed 
that an important reason the trial 
court found the co-op legal was that 
it was open to all permit holders. 
Options for Restructuring 
We now are authorized to 
determine a number range 
that would be optimal for 
a fishery for the long term. 
. . . We don’t know if we 
have an answer we can 
rely upon until and unless 
we get a favorable decision 
from the Supreme Court. 
That can leave matters 





When we were doing the 
Chignik co-op . . . one 
of the things that was 
important to us [was] this 
choice concept. You could 
choose to join the co-op 
and the co-op couldn’t 
exclude you. The superior 
court agreed with us.
   
Dan Coffey, 
former chairman,
Alaska Board of Fisheries
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In federal fisheries 
management, the 
opportunities for [legal] 
challenge are less extensive 
than in state fisheries 
management issues.
   
Jim Barnett, fisheries 
attorney
What is attractive to me 
about a shared quota 
system is that everybody 
gets in according to 
a measure of their 
dependence upon the 
fishery in the past. It 
strikes me as a much more 
gentle and accommodating 
decision–accommodating 
all of the people who are 
already in the fishery–than 
the one we are called 
upon to make under our 
statute. As long as there 
were adequate constraints 
on consolidating too many 
quota shares in too few 
hands, I would argue that 
the shared quota would be 
entirely consistent with the 
least possible infringement 
on open entry fisheries.
Bruce Twomley, chairman, 
Commercial Fisheries 
Entry Commission
exclusive rights to fish. But they 
questioned whether such a system 
would even be feasible in the salmon 
fishery. Unlike halibut or pollock, 
salmon come in short, intense 
runs—and managers are often 
unable to predict the precise run size 
and timing from year to year.
Panelists said that CDQs, on the 
other hand, are much more likely to 
be found unconstitutional, if only 
certain communities or geographic 
areas are eligible.
What about Fish Traps?
Some fishermen have suggested 
re-introducing fish traps in some 
salmon fisheries, to reduce costs and 
improve quality. Fish traps have been 
illegal since statehood. However, 
there is no constitutional ban on fish 
traps—they are prohibited by 
Alaska Statutes 16.10.070 and 
16.10.100. Before fish traps could 
be used, the state legislature would 
have to repeal the statutes that ban 
them. The Board of Fisheries would 
then have to authorize groups to use 
fish traps and establish allocations 
for those traps.
Any permit holder could join and 
be treated the same as all other 
co-op members.
Quota Shares for Salmon?
In recent years, the federal govern-
ment has dramatically restructured 
management of several fisheries off 
Alaska through individual fishing 
quotas (IFQs) for halibut and sablefish 
and community development quotas 
(CDQs) for Bering Sea fisheries. 
IFQs are issued to individuals, based 
on their historical catch and other 
factors. CDQs are allocations of part 
of the allowable harvest to specific 
coastal communities.
Workshop panelists agreed that the 
Board of Fisheries already has the 
authority to allocate fish harvests 
among permit holders. It is under 
this authority that the board allocated 
the harvest between Chignik co-op 
members and independents.
And some panelists thought the state 
legislature might be able to shape a 
quota share system, similar to the 
federal system, that would not violate 
the constitutional ban on creating 
Annette Island Packing Company employees gather salmon from traps. 
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If you try to get too specific with 
your constitution, you may well have 
unintended consequences down the road. 
. . . The constitution is your bedrock 
enabling legal document.  . . .I think 
that just as a matter of policy people need 
to be not thinking of putting legislation 
into a constitutional format.
  
Mike Stanley, fisheries attorney
The workshop raised a lot of issues—many more than we are able to present here. But it’s clear 
that legal and constitutional issues will shape the ongoing debate over restructuring Alaska’s 
salmon fisheries. In summary, attorneys at the workshop said:
• Alaska’s constitutional open access provisions make restructuring more difficult, because it’s so 
hard to balance the constitutional requirement for open access to the fisheries with measures 
that restrict the numbers of boats and fishermen.
• Any restructuring option is fraught with uncertainty, because it’s often not clear if a change 
violates the constitution, until a court rules in a specific case.
• Avoid amending the constitution. Changing the constitution is difficult and risky. It’s 
preferable to use the flexibility in the existing constitutional framework.
• Fishermen can win the support of the Board of Fisheries by documenting restructuring 
options tailored to their own fisheries. They should be aware that the board has considerable 
authority to make management changes.
• Buybacks of permits are problematical, in part because reducing numbers of permits too 
much may violate the constitutional ban on creating “exclusive” fishery rights.
• Co-operatives and quota shares are restructuring ideas with promise. But CDQs are more 
likely to face constitutional challenges.
• Every fishery is unique, and any changes should be tailored to local conditions. Consider the 
needs of your regional fisheries and work to find creative solutions.
I encourage fishermen and others fac-
ing these issues to contemplate that for 
every solution to the predicament we are 
in, there are downsides – and before you 
embrace anything, make sure you are fully 
acquainted with the risks.
Bruce Twomley, Chairman
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
What Did We Learn?
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State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983), appeal dismissed, Ostrosky v. Alaska, 467 U.S. 
1201, 104 S.Ct. 2379, 81 L.Ed.2d 339 (1984). The court recognizes the inherent tension 
between limited entry and open access.
Johns v. CFEC, 758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1988). The court stated that: “To be constitutional, a 
limited entry system should impinge as little as possible on the open fishery clauses.”
Owsichek v. State, Guide Licensing and Control Board, 763 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1988). The court 
used common use provisions to strike down exclusive guiding areas.
McDowell v. State of Alaska, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989). The court used the constitution’s 
common use provisions to strike down a rural preference for subsistence use.
State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995). The court used the constitution’s 
common use provisions to strike down proximity to the resource as criterion for Tier II 
subsistence use.
Workshop Panelists
Jim Barnett has practiced law in Alaska since 1974. He is a former deputy commissioner of the 
Alaska Department of Natural Resources. He has represented Bristol Bay Economic Development 
Corporation for the past seven years and has participated in many regional fisheries projects to 
develop solutions to the current fisheries crisis.
Bruce Twomley, chairman of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, has been on the 
commission since 1982, when he was appointed by Governor Jay Hammond. He’s been re-
appointed by four succeeding governors. Before joining the commission, he spent 10 years suing 
the state and federal governments as a lawyer with Alaska Legal Services Corporation.
Lance Nelson has been an assistant state attorney general in the Natural Resources Section 
in Anchorage for more than 18 years. He’s been the primary attorney for the Alaska Board of 
Fisheries for several years and has worked on fishery issues for more than 14 years.
Dan Coffey is a lifelong Alaska resident who works as an attorney in Anchorage, specializing in 
real estate and commercial law. Governor Tony Knowles appointed him chairman of the Alaska 
Board of Fisheries in 1996; he served two terms, including time as chairman.
Mike Stanley is an attorney in private practice in Juneau, emphasizing fisheries and administrative 
law. He represents clients in fisheries litigation in state and federal courts and before such agencies 
as the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission and the Board of Fisheries. Before opening his 
private practice in 1985, he was an attorney with the Alaska region of the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration.
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